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There is an inherent tension between the First Amendment and trademark law. For over 100 years
the United States Patent and Trademark Office has protected American citizens from Marks of illrepute. In the wake of the In re Tam decision, this may become more difficult if not impossible. This
In re Tam, as well as explores the
another. Additionally, this comment proposes solutions that will allow the government to continue
protecting its citizens from Marks that should have no place in commerce.
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IT S MY MARK, I CAN OFFEND IF I WANT TO! THE WANING OF THE
GOVERNMENT S POWER TO PROTECT ITS CITIZENS FROM WIDESPREAD
DISCRIMINATORY MARKS
PAUL SANDERS*
I. INTRODUCTION
unique.
-Primo Angeli
charged with the duty of granting U.S. patents and registering trademarks. 1 The
USPTO registers trademarks based on the commerce clause of the United States
3
Constitution,2
The USPTO prides itself in protecting new ideas and promoting creativity in
various ways.4
granting patents and/or registering trademarks. 5 In essence, the USPTO serves as the
gatekeeper to the marketplace.6 As an extension of the government, the USPTO has
the power to, in the case of trademarks, approve or deny registration based on certain
criteria set forth in the Lanham Act.7
On December 22, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
made a ruling that could have devastating
* Paul Sanders 2017. Candidate for Juris Doctor, The John Marshall Law School, 2018; Master
of Arts in Corporate Training and Development, 2014; Bachelor of Arts in Corporate Communications
and minor in Pre-Law, Eastern Illinois University, 2010. I would like to thank my editors, whom
provided feedback, support, and advice during the writing of this comment. I would like to thank The
John Marshall Law School, The Review of Intellectual Property Law, as well as, Professor Maureen
Collins and Brian Jones for their guidance and support through the legal writing process. Most
importantly, I would like to thank my wife, family, and friends for their continued support, for without
them, none of this would be possible.
1 United States Patent and Trademark Office, http://www.uspto.gov/about-us (last visited Feb.
12, 2017). The USPTO was established on January 2, 1975 by the United States Department of

mission to create the conditions for economic growth and opportunity by promoting innovation,
entrepreneurship, competitiveness, and stewardship.
2 Art. 1, §
foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the In
3 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (formally known as the Trademark Act of 1905). See 1 Jerome Gilson et
al., Trademark Protection and Practice § 3.04(4), at 3 (December 2003). The Lanham Act was the
product of several modifications regarding trademark law.
4 United States Patent and Trademark Office, supra note 1.
5 See id. The USPTO must adhere to relevant law and extensively research a multitude of things,
whether for patent grants or trademark registration.
6 See id. The USPTO furthers effective Intellectual Property (IP) for United States innovators
and entrepreneurs worldwide by working with other agencies to secure strong IP provisions in free
trade and other international agreements.
7 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a), (b), (c), (d), (e).
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apparent race and inequality issues.8 Not only did the Court negate over 100 years of
jurisprudence, it also negated over 100 years of government protection. 9
statement about
10 He filed an application to register his
Mark/band name, but the USPTO denied registration. 11 The USPTO examiner denied
registration pursuant to section 2(a) of the Lanham Act. 12 The Board affirmed the
13

disparaging and that section 2(a) was unconstitutional. 14 The panel affirmed the
termination that his Mark was disparaging. 15
In re McGinley,16 the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, sua
sponte, ordered rehearing en banc.17
The majority invalidated section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, ruling that it suppresses
18 while the splintered dissent says
19
something quite different.
This comment examines the Tam decision in greater detail throughout four
sections. Part I provides background information on the Lanham Act, more specifically,
section 2(a) of the Act and its importance to trademark law. Part I additionally explores
8
9

See In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
See In re Lebanese Arak Corp., 94 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1215 (2010). Beginning with the Trademark Act

10

See Tam, 808 F.3d at 1331. Tam was the lead singer for the Asian-American dance-rock band.

stereotypes.
11 See id.
12 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). The examiner used subsection (a) to deny registration deeming the mark
disparaging. Subsection (a) bars an examiner from registering scandalous, immoral, and/or
disparaging marks. The examiner found that the mark negatively referred to people of Asian descent.
13 See Tam, 808 F.3d at 1332. To support the finding that the mark referred to people of Asian
descent, the Board looked to dictionaries and referenced different works. All of the evidence discovered
ging
and community viewpoints.
14 Id.
15 See id. at 1332there was substantial evidence that supported the finding that the mark refers to people of Asian
descent. The panel looked to articles where Tam spoke about his band name, dictionaries, and the fact
that Tam was to speak at an Asian American Youth Leadership Conference, but was not allowed
because there was concern of his band being offensive and racist.
16 660 F.2d 481 (C.C.P.A. 1981). The reviewing panel relied on the precedent set forth by the
McGinley Court, which held that the First Amendment is not implicated by Section 2 of the Lanham
Act.
17 See Tam, 808 F.3d at 1339-40. The Court sought to address the issue between the First
Amendment and section 2 of the Lanham Act, essentially, by reviewing the McGinley decision.
18 See id. at 1331.
19 See id. at 1363-1382. Judge Dyk agrees with the majority that the bar on registration of
disparaging marks is unconstitutional as applied to Tam; however, Dyk states that in the case of
purely commercial speech, the decision would be different. Dyk, J., concurring in-part and dissenting
inapplied for nearly seventy years. Lourie, J., dissenting. Lastly, Judge Reyna dissents because the
government has a substantial interest in the orderly flow of commerce and § 2(a) was an appropriate
regulation. Reyna, J., dissenting.
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the inherent tension between the First Amendment and trademark law. Part II
discusses how the Court ruled incorrectly and what its decision means going forward.
Part III introduces a new way of looking at trademark law and First Amendment
issues. Part IV summarizes the comment s main points and reiterates the USPTO
duties and the new way of looking at trademark law.
II. BACKGROUND
A trademark typically protects brand names and logos used in connection with
good and services.
Applicants desiring Mark registration must file an application with the USPTO. 20
An examiner s review of an application is intricate, not every Mark is registrable or
even legally protectable.21 Once the USPTO determines that the applicant has met the
minimum filing requirements, the application is forwarded to an examining attorney.22
The examining attorney reviews the application to determine whether it complies with
all applicable rules and statutes, and includes all required fees.23 Approval of the Mark
is first manifested through publication in the weekly publication of USPTO, the
informing the applicant of the fact. 24 A party has 30 days from
the date of publication to come forward with oppositions to the Mark.25 If there are no
oppositions, the Mark is registered.26
An examiner can deny registration for many reasons.27
deny registration gives rise to section 2(a) of the Lanham Act.28 This section discusses
the history of trademark law, and the law as it was as it relates to the First
Amendment.
A. The Birth of Lanham Act
The first trademark statute was enacted shortly after the Civil War. 29 The statute
came as a response to the significant growth of trade that followed the Reconstruction
period.30 The first Federal Trademark law was enacted in 1870. 31 The law was
20 United States Patent and Trademark Office, http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-gettingstarted/trademark-process (last visited Feb. 12, 2017).
21 Id. Some marks may contain words that are too common or too generic to be protected. Also,
marks which are too similar to other registered marks or are likely to confuse consumers are not
protectable.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 See United States Patent and Trademark Office, https://www.legalzoom.com/knowledge/
trademark/topic/trademark-grounds-for-refusal.
28 See id.; see United States Patent and Trademark Office, supra note 20.
29 Spiegel and Utrera Lawyers, A Brief History of Trademark Law in the USA, (last accessed
Feb. 10, 2017, 5:15 P.M.), available at http://www.amerilawyer.com/pdf/404.pdf.
30 See id.
31 See id.

[16:505 2017]

Can Offend If I Want To!

509

amended in 1878, and shortly thereafter it was struck down by the Supreme Court. 32
Congress responded with the Trademark Act of 1881, which was based on its
Commerce Clause powers.33 This law, however, was unable to accommodate the
development of the American economy and underwent a major amendment in 1905. 34
After World War II, there was an explosion of trademark activity and the need to
educate the public about trademark law surfaced.35 As a result, the Lanham Act was
enacted on July 5, 1946.36 The Act was named after a congressman who had devoted
himself to its creation and progress.37
The Act establishes a procedure for the federal registration of trademarks. 38 If a
Mark meets certain qualifications, it can be listed on the Principal Register, which
affords the owner of the mark many benefits.39 Registration is not mandatory to receive
trademark protection, but federally registered trademarks receive stronger protection
than unregistered trademarks.40 Federal registration is limited to trademarks and
service marks being used by the Mark owner in interstate commerce.41
In addition to federal registration, each of the fifty states have its own system of
trademark registration.42 If a trademark meets the state's qualifications, it can be
listed on the state's trademark registry.43 Similar to federal registration, state
registration is not mandatory to receive trademark protection or to use a state's court
system to enforce trademark rights.44

32 See The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 98-99 (1879). The Court struck down the law for
exceeding the powers granted by the patent and copyright clauses of the Constitution.
33 See U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
34 See Trademark Act of 1905. Section 5(a) was a simple bar against registration of marks
-Section 5 later became Section 2 of the Trademark Act
of 1946 with some additions.
35 See Spiegel, supra note 29.
36 See id.
37 See Texas State Historical Association, https://tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/fla33
(last visited Sept. 14, 2016). The Lanham Act was named after Fritz G. Lanham. He served on
Congress from 1919 until 1947. He was a great advocate for strong trademark protection.
38 See Spiegel, supra note 29.
39 See United States Patent and Trademark Office, https://www.uspto.gov/about-trademarks
(last visited Feb. 12, 2017). See also 5 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair
Competition § 26:31 (4th ed.).
40 See McCarthy at § 26:31.
41 See Spiegel, supra note 29. See also B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Ind., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293,
1300 (2015) (explaining that registration is significant. The Lanham Act confers important legal rights
and benefits on trademark owners who register their marks). See Tam, 808 F.3d at 1328. The holder
of a federal trademark has a right to exclusive nationwide use of that mark where there was no prior
use by others (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1072, 1115). See also 5 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on
Trademarks and Unfair Competition
the right to exclusive use only in the geographic areas where he has actually used his mark, holders
of a federally registered trademark have an important substantive right they could not otherwise
42 See United States Patent and Trademark Office, https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-gettingstarted/process-overview/state-trademark-information-links (last visited Feb. 12, 2017).
43 See id.
44 See id. It is possible for a state-registered trademark, or a common law unregistered
trademark, to have rights superior to a trademark with a valid federal registration, due to an earlier
date of adoption combined with actual and continuous use.
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Prior to Congress amending the Lanham Act, 45 there was a test utilized to address
whether a Mark was scandalous.46 However, as the court in In re Lebanese explicitly
addressed, the test for scandalous-ness was not the proper test to use when addressing
marks that may be disparaging.47 The disparagement bar differs from the scandalous
bar, mostly because there is a specific object of disparagement.48
Determining whether a Mark is disparaging requires application of a two-part
test: (1) what is the likely meaning of the matter in question, taking into account not
only dictionary definitions, but also the relationship of the matter to the other elements
in the Mark, the nature of the goods or services, and the manner in which the Mark is
used in the marketplace in connection with the goods or services; and (2) if that
meaning is found to refer to identifiable persons, institutions, beliefs or national
symbols, whether that meaning may be disparaging to a substantial composite of the
referenced group.49
comparison with what is inferior, slights, deprecates, degrades, affects or injures by
unjust comparison. 50
An examiner applies this two-part test when investigating whether a proposed
Mark is disparaging in violation of section 2(a) and whether it should be registered. 51
The examiner, sometimes multiple examiners, research the terms used, mostly looking
up definitions and finding evidence that may or may not lead them to rejecting the
Mark.52
the marks may express to the referenced group.
See 15 U.S.C. §
See In re Mavety Media Group, 33 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that a mark may
be found scandalous only if it is offensive to a substantial composite of the general public).
47 94 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1215, 1216-17 (2010). See In re Riverbank Canning Company, 95 F.2d 327
(CCPA 1938); see also In re Sociedade Agricola E. Comercial Dos Vinhos Messias, S.A.R.L., 159 USPQ
275 (TTAB 1963). These
-part disparagement test took into account the sensibilities of
ethnic and/or religious groups, which the scandalous test failed to do.
48 See 1 Jerome Gilson et al., Trademark Protection and Practice § 3.04(6)(a)(i)(B), at 3-122
(December 2003). Gilson recognizes that a person, group, set of beliefs, institution or symbol, is
typically the object of disparagement and the statutory bar depends on the perspective of the object of
disparagement. In contrast, the scandalousness provision protects the public as a whole and the effect
of the trademark is judged from the perspective of the general public.
49 Lebanese Arak Corp.,
§
1203.03(b)(i) (Jan. 2015 ed.).
50 See In re Geller
45
46

rican Muslims, and the
51

I

See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a); see also Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 490
see also Geller,
see also Bos. Red Sox Baseball Club L.P. v. Sherman, 88 U.S.P.Q.2d

of marks such as: THE CHRISTIAN PROSTITUTE (2013); HAVE YOU HEARD THAT SATAN IS A
REPUBLICAN? (2010); ABORT THE REPUBLICANS (2009); MARRIAGE IS FOR FAGS (2008);
(2006); and N.I.G.G.A. (NATURALLY INTELLIGENT GOD GIFTED AFRICANS) (1996).
52 See Tam, 808 F.3d at 1332-34. USPTO examiners reference dictionaries, articles, statements
See also Lebanese, 94 U.S.P.Q.
2d at 1217. Evidence was submitted by examiners which demonstrated that drinking alcohol is
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B. Freedom of Speech Guarantee
The First Amendment guarantees freedoms concerning religion, expression,
assembly, and the right to petition. 53 In regard to speech, the First Amendment
guarantees freedom of expression by prohibiting Congress from restricting the rights
of individuals to speak freely.54 However, the right to speak freely is not absolute. 55
Congress cannot regulate content-based speech;56 and strict scrutiny is applied to
laws which seek to regulate such speech.57 Content-neutral speech, however, may be
regulated when the government seeks to regu
speech.58 In a secondary effects analysis, the Court looks to the time, place, and manner
of the regulation.59 Content-neutral speech is reviewed under intermediate scrutiny
because the speech, itself, is not sought to be regulated.60 The Supreme Court
developed a four-factor test to apply when analyzing whether restricting contentneutral speech is constitutional.61 Congress also cannot regulate based on its
See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See id.
55 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (holding that words may become subject
to prohibition when used in such circumstances that create a clear and present danger and will bring
about the substantive evils which Congress has a right to prevent). See also Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding that lewd and obscene language is not within the area of constitutionally
protected speech). See also Chaplinsky v. N.H., 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (holding that words that have
a direct tendency to cause acts of violence in a public place are not constitutionally protected). There
are areas of speech which are of slight social value that any benefit that may be derived from them is
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
56 Reno v. Aclu, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997). The Court invalidated the Communications Decency
Act of 1996, holding that it lacked the precision that the First Amendment required when a statute
protecting children
from potentially harmful materials, the statute suppressed a large amount of speech that adults have
a constitutional right receive.
57 See Tom W. Bell, Free Speech, Strict Scrutiny, and Self-Help: How Technology Upgrades
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 87 MINN. L. REV. 743, 745 (2003). The First Amendment requires that
the government prove that a content-based restriction on speech (1) advances a compelling
government interest, and (2) is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 879.
The government could not meet the least restrictive means standard to establish that its regulation
was narrowly tailored to achieve its government interest of protecting children from obscenities.
58 See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 49 (1986). In Renton, the Court upheld a
zoning ordinance that kept adult movie theatres out of residential neighborhoods. The ordinance was
such
as crime and deteriorating property values that the theatres foster.
59 See Reno, 521 U.S. at 868. The Court held that the secondary effects analysis could not apply
because the Communications Decency Act was a content-based blanket restriction on speech.
60 See Ward v. Rock against Racism, 491 U.S. 781. Content neutral time, place and manner
regulations are permissible if they are narrowly tailored to serve a substantial government interest
and do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of expression. See Members of City Council v.
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 817 (1984). The restriction on expression which results from a
city's attempt to eliminate visual clutter is justified as a reasonable regulation of the time, place, or
manner of expression if it is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.
61 See
, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). A government regulation is justified if
1.) it is within the constitutional power of the government, 2.) it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest, 3.) the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression, and 4.) the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of that interest. See also Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994)
(recognizing a fifth factor whether the restriction leaves open ample channels of communication).
53
54
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disagreement with a viewpoint.62 The First Amendment does not permit the
government imposing special prohibitions on speakers who express disfavored views.63
Additionally, the Supreme Court has made a distinction between commercial
speech64 and noncommercial speech.65 Though, what constitutes commercial speech is
somewhat fact intensive,66 typically, when advertisements and/or transactional-type
dealings are present, courts view those dealings as commercial speech. 67 The protection
available for commercial speech depends on the nature of both the expression and of
the governmental interests served by its regulation. 68 Noncommercial speech consists
of private or political speech, which cannot be regulated. 69 Speech dealing with
information or knowledge is viewed as noncommercial speech and receives full
protection.70

See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387 (1992) (holding an ordinance unconstitutional because
it prohibited otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addressed). The
statute served a compelling interest, there were contentneutral alternatives available.
63 See id. at 383. See Police
, 408 U.S. 92, 98 (1972). The Court found
that Louisiana attempted to pick and choose the views it was willing to have discussed on its streets
by permitting picketing for labor union views, but prohibiting other sorts of picketing such as views
against racial discrimination.
64 See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983). The Court laid out a threepart inquiry in determining whether speech is commercial: (1) is the material meant to be an
advertisement, (2) does the material reference a particular product, and (3) is there is an economic
motivation for disseminating the material? Commercial speech exists when all of the attributes are
present. See Virginia State Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
762 (1976). Speech which does no more than propose a commercial transaction is not so removed from
any exposition of ideas and from truth, science, morality, and arts in general, that it lacks all
protection under the First Amendment.
65 See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988). The Supreme Court recognized that the First
Amendment reflects a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public and
political issues should be uninhibited and wide-open (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 270 (1964)). See Snyder v. Phelps, 362 U.S. 443, 452 (2011). Speech concerning public matters,
rather than private, receives the highest degree of protection because it is more than self-expression;
it is the essence of self-government. Private speech, while protected, receives less protection because
there is no threat to the robust debate of public issues.
66 See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951) (noting that the selling aspect brings into
the transaction a commercial feature). See also Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 144-45 (holding
that distribution of leaflets publicizing a religious meeting has no commercial element).
67 See Bolger, 463 U.S. 60;
,
447 U.S. 557 (1980).
68 See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975) (holding that advertising, like all public
expression, may be subject to reasonable regulation that serves a legitimate public interest). To the
extent that commercial activity is subject to regulation, the relationship of speech to that activity may
be one factor, among others, to be considered in weighing the First Amendment interest against the
governmental interest alleged.
69 See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467. The Free Speech Clause restricts
government regulation of private, expressive speech.
70 See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 63. The government attempted to suppress the mailing of contraceptive
information to individuals. The Court held the law unconstitutional because the decision to withhold
information of that nature is the right of the parents. Id.
tutes the basic constitutional defect regardless of the strength of
Id. at 75. The Court was silent on whether the ruling would have been different
if there were solicitations being mailed.
62
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The Central Hudson Court laid out four factors to analyze when assessing the
validity of restrictions on commercial speech. It is essential to determine: (1) whether
the expression is constitutionally protected, for commercial speech to receive
protection, it must be lawful activity and not be misleading; (2) whether the
governmental interest asserted is substantial, if so, (3) whether the regulation directly
advances the government interest asserted; and (4) whether the regulation is not more
extensive than necessary to serve that interest. 71 The First Amendment and its
application was at the forefront of the Tam discussion.
C. The Tam of it All
Prior to the Tam decision, this area of law was unaltered for over one hundred
years;72 and the Lanham Act gave the proper amount of discretion to the USPTO. 73
Monitoring marks that may be immoral, scandalous, and/or disparaging has been the
duty of the examiners since the Trademark Act of 1905. 74 Examiners are trusted to
analyze particular marks and decide whether the marks should be registered based on
a multitude of factors.75 More specifically, prior to the Tam decision, the
disparagement bar was intact and the Courts did not realize any First Amendment
issues.76
In re McGinley was highly discussed within Tam as it was the leading precedent.77
In that case, the Court was presented with similar issues as the court in Tam.78
McGinley
First Amendment rights were

See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
See Tam
issue trademark registrations with certain offensive content has existed in U.S. law for over one
71
72

73 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052. Specifically, sections a-e explicitly gives an examiner the power to
investigate and refuse registration of a mark if the mark or its representation falls into one of the
mentioned categories.
74 See Trademark Act of 1905; see also Tam, 808 F.3d at 1374. The Trademark Act of 1905
provided specific authority to refuse to register immoral or scandalous marks. Lourie, J., dissenting.
75 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052. Sub-sections (a)-(f) set forth limitations to mark registration.
76 See Tam, 808 F.3d. See also In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481 (1981) (ruling that First Amendment
77 See Tam, at 1333. The Court has been criticized for more than 30 years for its reliance on the
McGinley decision.
78 See id.; see also McGinley, 660 F.2d. 481. The questioned marks in both cases were evaluated
using section 2 of the Lanham Act.
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not suppressed due to a denial of federal trademark registration. 79 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit turned this proposition on its head. 80
III. ANALYSIS
Tam brought suit questioning the validity of section 2(a) of Lanham Act.81 Tam
asserted that § 2(a) burdened his First Amendment right to free speech and therefore
was unconstitutional.82
A. Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act is Constitutional
Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act prohibits disparaging marks from being federally
registered.83
Tam alleged that § 2(a) violates free speech because it suppresses the content of
speech and examiners arbitrarily deny marks because of what they think is
disparaging to a group of people.84
The Tam Court applied strict scrutiny to the challenged government regulation, 85
and held that the act of discriminating based on message disapproval is not content or
viewpoint neutral.86 Furthermore, the Court concluded that trademark registration is

See McGinley, 660 F.2d at 484. In McGinley, an applicant sought to register a photograph of a
nude man and woman kissing and embracing in a manner appearing to expose the male genitalia.
79

newsletter dealt with discussions of sexual topics such as bisexuality, masturbation, and fornication;
a form of group sex. The U.S. Court of Customs and Patent
so no conduct was proscribed, no tangible form of expression was suppressed, and no First Amendment
rights we
80 See Tam, 808 F.3d at 1357-58. The Court reversed the McGinley decision and ruled that
section 2(a) of the Lanham Act is unconstitutional because it suppresses free speech.
81 See Tam, 808 F.3d at 1332.
82 Id.
83 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).
84 See Tam, 808 F.3d at 1333-34; see Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 466
(Ed. Virginia, 2015). The Court noted that the Act does not authorize or encourage "arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement." A statute authorizes or encourages arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement when there are minimal guidelines that indicate what the law applies to. Id. (citing
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983). The Court found that the USPTO sets forth sufficient
guidelines that identify which matters "may disparage" under § 2(a). Id. Among other things, the
USPTO publishes the letters of Examining Attorneys' decisions to approve or deny registration on its
website. Id. The USPTO has also published instructions for Examining Attorneys in its Trademark
Manual of Examining Procedure ("T.M.E.P."). T.M.E.P. § 1203(b) addresses the "may disparage"
portion of section 2(a). See Trademark Manual
§ 1203.03(b)(i) (Jan. 2015
ed.).
85 See Tam, 808 F.3d at 1339-40. The Court uses strict scrutiny as the standard of review when
a governmental regulation burdens private speech based on message disapproval.
86 See id. at 1340-43.
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not government speech.87 Lastly, the Court concluded that § 2(a) is also
unconstitutional under the Central Hudson Test for Commercial Speech.88
The majority in the Tam decision erred in determining that bars on marks that
may disparage persons are unconstitutional because those restrictions do not further
89

comparison with what is inferior, slights, deprecates, degrades, or affects or injures by
90 The Trademark Board defined disparagement by stating that it
is
-the right to be let alone from
contempt or ridicule. 91 The evaluation of disparagement is not based on the
92 but based only on evidence of the perception of the
93 The examiners utilize an objective test-one that does not allow for
the examiners to arbitrarily make decisions.94
narrowly.95 As Judge Lourie makes
96

regulate commerce, commerce, meaning trademarks that can and will be used among
state lines.97 Since 1905, the government has upheld the duty of refusing mark
registrations that may be offensive and/or scandalous. 98 There is no reason for the

87 See id. at 1345-48. The Court referenced the Walker case, which dealt with specialty license
plates in determining that trademarks are not government speech.
88 See id. at 1355-57.
89 See Tam
is to prevent

investment in the mark.
90 See In re Geller, 751 F.3d at 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see TEMP § 1203.03(b)(i) (Jan. 2015 ed.).
91 See TMEP § 1203.03(b).
92 See Tam, 808 F.3d at 1375. Lourie, J., dissenting.
93 See id. at 1375-76. The government action does not include a judgment on the worthiness or
the effectiveness of the mark; if it did, it might venture into viewpoint discrimination territory. See
also Lebanese Arak Corp., 94 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1218. The proper ground for refusing marks which would
offend the sensibilities of an ethnic or religious group is that the matter is disparaging to the members
of that group, rather than that the matter is offensive or scandalous.
94 See Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 466 (Ed. Virginia, 2015); see TEMP
§ 1203.03(b)(i) (Jan. 2015 ed.). The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board established a two-part test to
determine whether a mark contains matter that "may disparage:"
(1) what is the likely meaning the matter in question, taking into account not only dictionary
definitions, but also the relationship of the matter to the other elements in the mark, the nature of
the goods or services, and the manner in which the mark is used in the marketplace in connection
with the goods or services; and (2) if that meaning is found to refer to identifiable persons, institutions,
beliefs or national symbols, whether that meaning may be disparaging to a substantial composite of
the referenced group.
95 See supra note 87.
96 15 U.S.C. § 1127. See Tam, 808 F.3d at 1378. Lourie, J., dissenting.
97 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See also Tam, 808 F.3d at 1379. The government has a
substantial interest in the orderly flow of commerce.
98 See
Trade
Mark
Act
of
1905,
Federal
Register
of
Legislation,
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Series/C1905A00020NO (last visited Mar. 10, 2017). See Tam, 808 F.3d
at 1374. The USPTO has been declining to register disparaging trademarks years before the Lanham
Act even existed. Lourie, J., dissenting.
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which advance egregious messages, from the federal trademark registration system.99
B. There is No First Amendment Violation
Most the Tam discussion revolves around the First Amendment and its guarantee
of free speech.100 Tam argued that his speech was suppressed when the USPTO denied
his mark federal registration.101 He alleged that the mark was wrongly denied
registration because the message is not one of ill repute. 102
A case similar to the present one at issue is In re Geller.103 Applicants Pamela
Geller and Robert Spencer filed an intent-topreventing terrorism.104 The examiner refused to register the Mark on the ground that
the Mark may be disparaging to American Muslims pursuant to section 2(a) of the
Lanham Act.105
associating peaceful political Islamisation with terrorism would be disparaging to a
substantial composite of American Muslims.106
In the present case, the Federal Circuit invalidated section 2(a) of the Lanham
Act holding that the content and viewpoint based regulation did not survive strict
scrutiny.107 However, the Court should not have applied strict scrutiny because § 2(a)
is not content based discrimination.
1. Content and Viewpoint Based Discrimination
The Federal Circuit Court erred when it interpreted § 2(a) to be content based and
viewpoint discriminatory on its face. Content-based statutes regulate speech based on

99 Id. at 1374. The purpose of § 2(a) is to protect underrepresented groups in our society from
being bombarded with demeaning messages in commercial advertising.
100 See Ysursa v. Pocatello
, 555 U.S. 353, 360-61 (2009). The First Amendment
protects the right to be free from government abridgement of speech.
101 See Tam,
racial and cultural issues in the country.
102 Id. Tam also questioned the constitutionally of § 2 of the Lanham Act.
103 See Geller, 751 F.3d 1355. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed
Id. at 1361. The Court

meaning-a political meaning, as opposed to, a religious meaning. Id. at 1361. The Court explained
that under both meanings, the mark may be found disparaging. Id. at 1361.
104 Id. at 1357.
105 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).
106 See Geller, 751 F.3d at 1358a political meaning, as well as, a religious meaning. The Board looked to dictionaries, essays posted
brought a negative connotation to the phrase.
107 See Tam, 751 F.3d at 1357-58.
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its subject matter.108 Section 2(a) does not restrict speech itself, only what the speech
may represent to targeted individuals. 109 For § 2(a) to be a content-based regulation,
the government would have to regulate all content within §2 (a), regardless of
interpretation or meaning.110
objective test would not exist.111
Similar to content-based discrimination, viewpoint-based discrimination is
reviewed under strict scrutiny.112 Section 2(a) is not viewpoint discrimination because
the government is not favoring one opinion or viewpoint over another. 113 The bedrock
the real rationale for the restriction is disagreement with the underlying ideology or
114 The government is not in disagreement with
115
messages that specific marks display; the citizens or the specific group that the mark
potentially singles out are the ones disagreeing.116 The USPTO makes its decisions
based on evidence proffered by the applicant, the affected parties, dictionary
definitions, and societal norms.117
In Boos v. Barry, the Supreme Court addressed a similar issue as applied to
political speech.118 The relevant law prohibited the display of any sign within 500 feet
of a foreign embassy if the sign would tend to bring that foreign government into
119

See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462-63 (1980). A Chicago ordinance described permissible
management dispute, but prohibited all other peaceful picketing.
109 See Tam, 751 F.3d at 1364.
110 See § 1052(a). The government would have to regulate disparaging marks regardless of
whether the specified group thinks that the marks are disparaging.
111 See Lebanese, 94 U.S.P.Q. 2D at 1217. The two-part test calls for (1) the investigation of the
(2) whether that meaning may be disparaging to a substantial composite
of that referenced group. This is determined by research
Examiners look to outside evidence, not their subjective views. Courts analyzing content-based
regulations have not encountered regulations that involve tests for determining whether an individual
is in violation, rather the activity itself constitutes a prima facie violation. Section 2(a) is for
commercial activity and that is what it seeks to regulate.
112 See
460 U.S. 37, 66 (1983). The Supreme
Court noted that viewpoint discrimination implicates core First Amendment values and is permissible
only if the government can show that a regu
state interest."
113 See § 1052(a). See Perry, 460 U.S. at 48-49. The Court of Appeals ruled that the access policy,
which only allowed the teachers union to access an inter-school mailing system, favored a particular
viewpoint on labor relations, and consequently must be strictly scrutinized. Id. at 48. However, there
was no indication that the School Board intended to discourage one viewpoint and advance another.
Id. at 49. The Supreme Court ruled that it is more accurate to characterize the access policy as based
on the status of the respective unions rather than their views.
114 Ridley v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 82 (1st Cir. 2004).
115 See id. at 82. The essence of viewpoint discrimination is not that the government incidentally
prevents certain viewpoints from being heard in the course of suppressing certain general topics of
speech, rather, it is a governmental intent to intervene in a way that prefers one particular viewpoint
in speech over other perspectives on the same topic.
116 See Lebanese, 94 U.S.P.Q. 2D at 1219. The disparagement test is in place so that the affected
group can be at the center of the concern.
117 See TMEP § 1203.03(b)(i) (Jan. 2015 ed.). See Tam, 808 F.3d at 1359.
118 Boos, 485 U.S. at 315.
119 Id.
108
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not viewpoint discrimination because the display clause determined which viewpoint
was acceptable in a neutral fashion by looking to the policies of foreign governments. 120
The same reasoning applies to the present case. Section 2(a) is not advancing the
government or any one
.121 The disparagement test determines
matter of particular marks.122
As previously mentioned, the Federal Circuit interpreting § 2(a) as content-based
and viewpoint discriminatory was error; the regulation is content-neutral.123 The
suppression of the expression, then the regulation is content-neutral.124 The
the orderly flow of commerce is unrelated to the suppression
125 Furthermore, the government is seeking to address the harmful
secondary effects of disparaging marks. 126 Allowing disparaging marks to enter the
stream of commerce can have negative consequences.127 For example, certain groups
may begin to stray away from places that promote or show these marks, which
ultimately, may affect interstate commerce.128 Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act can be
read to be content neutral and intermediate scrutiny should apply.129 Additionally,
intermediate scrutiny should be applied to trademarks because they have commercial

120 Id. at 319. The Court did hold that the statute was content-based and applied strict scrutiny.
The Court affords the highest degree of protection to political speech.
121 See Ridley, 390 F.3d at 90-91. A regulation prohibiting disparaging ads was viewpoint neutral

See Lebanese, 94 U.S.P.Q. 2D at 1216.
See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). The Supreme
Court held that a Park Service regulation that prohibited camping in certain parks to call attention
to the plight of the homeless did not violate the First Amendment because the regulation was justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, was narrowly tailored to serve a substantial
governmental interest, and left open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information. Id. Similarly, § 2(a) brings attention to the negative effects that can come from
disparaging marks.
124 See id. at 294. The government interest in conserving park property was unrelated to the
demonstrators' message about homelessness. The demonstrators were allowed to erect "symbolic tent
cities," but they were not allowed to sleep overnight in those tents. Id. at 295.
125 See id.
126 Renton, 475 U.S. at 47. See also
, 529 U.S. 277, 291 (2000). The
Supreme Court upheld a statute that did not attempt to regulate the primary effects of the expression,
but rather the secondary effects, such as impacts on public health, safety, and welfare. The public
indecency ordinance made it a summary offense to knowingly or intentionally appear in public in a
Id. at 283.
127 Tam, 808 F.3d at 1379-80.
128 See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 302 (1964) (finding that racial discrimination in
restaurants had a direct and highly restrictive effect upon interstate travel by negroes and other
minorities). See also Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964). The Supreme
Court held that the authority of Congress to promote interstate commerce encompasses the power to
regulate local activities of interstate commerce when those activities would otherwise have a
substantial and harmful effect upon the interstate commerce. The Heart of Atlanta Motel, which
rented rooms to traveling guests, was within minutes of major interstates. Prior to the federal
prohibition of racial discrimination, the motel had a practice of not renting rooms to blacks. Arguing
that its establishment was local in nature, it fought the law. Id. at 243-44.
129 See supra note 123. See Tam, 808 F.3d at 1378. Reyna, J., dissenting.
122
123
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speech qualities and should not be given as much protection as private/expressive
speech.130
2. Intermediate Scrutiny Applies to Trademarks
Contrary to the Federal Circuits interpretation, trademarks are more
characterized as commercial speech.131 Trademarks are essentially advertisements,
which propose a transaction.132 The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution
gives less protection to com
133 The amount of protection granted to commercial expression depends on
the nature of the expression and the nature of the governmental interests served by
its regulation.134
In Central Hudson, the Court adopted a four-part analysis for assessing the
validity of restrictions on commercial speech. 135 The majority in Tam completely
dismissed the commercial speech argument made by the government, disregarding the
Central Hudson analysis.136 The Federal Circuit found
commercial speech because it had an expressive element to it. 137 The majority contends
the mark is not commercial speech
and strict scrutiny must apply.138 However, the Supreme Court has made clear
139

essentially what Tam is doing with his

Mark. 140

This is
s an

130 See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983). The degree of protection given
by the First Amendment depends on whether the activity sought to be regulated is commercial or
noncommercial speech.
131 See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11 (1979). Trade names are used as part of a proposal of
a commercial transaction. See Arina Shulga, Trade Names v. Trade Marks, Business Law Post,
December 17, 2010, http://www.businesslawpost.com/2010/12/trade-name-vs-trade-mark.html.
Tradenames can be deemed trademarks if used in commerce to advertise, promote, or identify goods
or services. In this regard, they are analogous.
132 See Van Lindberg, Intellectual Property and Open Source: A Practical Guide to Protecting
Code 107-108 (2008). One theory used to explain the function of trademarks in economic terms is that
they are essentially indistinguishable from advertising
seeking to gain exposure and relay
information.
133 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562-63.
134 Id. at 563.
135 See id. at 566. For commercial speech to receive some protection: first, it at least must concern
lawful activity and not be misleading; second, the governmental interest must be substantial. If it is,
the regulation must directly advance the governmental interest. Lastly, the regulation must not be
more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.
136 See Tam, 808 F.3d at 1357.
137 Id. at 1338. According to the Federal Circuit, Tam selected his mark to create a dialogue on
controversial political and social issues. Through his mark, Tam advocates for social change.
138 See id. at 1355.
139 See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 68. The contraceptive mailings constituted commercial speech
notwithstanding the fact that they contain discussions of important public issues such as venereal
disease and family planning.
140 See Tam, 808 F.3d 1321.
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advertisement which he is linking to a public debate about race and stereotypes. 141
Furthermore, he is attempting to use the streams of commerce to disseminate his
message.142
When applying the Central Hudson commercial speech analysis, it is important
to consider the nature of the speech taken as a whole. 143
SLANTS, is not misleading.144
mark, that based on research and evidence may be viewed as disparaging, to enter the
streams of commerce, is a substantial one. 145 Furthermore, the regulation of
disparaging marks directly advances the governmental interest of not allowing such
marks into the stream of commerce where specific groups may be signaled out and
disrupt the flow of commerce.146 Lastly, the government barring disparaging marks
from the streams of commerce is no more extensive than necessary to further the
the disparaging mark.147
The test factors weigh in favor of the government and supports no First
substantial governmental interest and is not more extensive than is necessary to serve
148 Section 2(a) satisfies the Central Hudson test, which maintains that
the regulation does not implicate the First Amendment.

141 See id. at 1327out society than
many volumes of protected speech.
142 See id. at 1376. Federally registered trademarks can be used across state lines; potentially
being disseminated to thousands of individuals.
143 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563. If the communication is neither misleading nor related
to unlawful activity, the government's power is more limited. The State must have a substantial
interest to be achieved by restrictions on commercial speech. Moreover, the regulatory technique must
not be excessive. The limitation on expression must be designed carefully to achieve the State's goal.
Compliance with this requirement may be measured by two criteria. First, the restriction must
directly advance the state interest involved; the regulation may not be sustained if it provides only
ineffective or remote support for the government's purpose. Second, if the governmental interest could
be served as well by a more limited restriction on commercial speech, the excessive restrictions cannot
survive.
144 See Tam, 808 F.3d at
activity-the government can still prevail under the substantial interest criterion, which would satisfy
intermediate scrutiny.
145 Id. at 1376-78. When the commercial or political content of a trademark threatens the

justified. Reyna, J., dissenting. See supra note 128. THE SLANTS traveling among state lines may
have substantial negative consequences among minorities and others.
146 Id. Travel may be halted as a result of such marks, or organized groups may come together
to resist such Marks in certain locations. This situations serve as disruptions to commerce, and
commerce has a substantial interest in this not occurring.
147 See id. at 1382. Commercial speech that insults groups of people, particularly based on their
race, gender, religion, or other demographic identity, tends to disrupt commercial activity and to
undermine marketplace stability. Tam is not completely halted from using his mark; he is still able
to use it at the state level where it will gain common law protection. See Daniel A. Tysver, Common
Law Trademark Rights, BITLAW, http://www.bitlaw.com/trademark/common.html (last visited Mar.
16, 2017).
148 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. This standard is met by going through the Central
Hudson analysis. See also Tam, 808 F.3d at 1382.
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As previously explained, the Federal Circuit erred when it held that section 2(a)
of the Lanham Act was not content-neutral.149 However, the governmen
150 While
noncommercial speech is entitled to the highest degree of protection, commercial
speech is not.151 Thus, a determination must be made as to trademarks and the
protection they receive when there is an expressive element to them. 152
IV. PROPOSAL
There is an inherent tension between free Speech guarantees and the
trademarks cannot be registered.153 One solution is to view trademarks as commercial
speech, which would require an intermediate scrutiny analysis. 154 Another solution is
to restructure the disparagement test.
A. Trademarks Under the Intermediate Umbrella
Congress granted the USPTO the power to grant and deny trademarks through
§ 1052.155 Trademarks are essentially commercial advertisements which promote
156 For this reason, intermediate
scrutiny should be the standard applied.
Intermediate scrutiny is satisfied when a law is substantially related to an
important governmental purpose.157 Trademarks should be regulated by the

See Tam, 808 F.3d at 1334.
See supra note 121.
151 See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 64-65.
152 The Federal Circuit decided to protect the speech as noncommercial speech. See Tam, 808
F.3d 1321. However, as mentioned earlier, any individual could claim their mark has an expressive
element to it and receive protection, thus registering many disparaging marks, perhaps more
.
153 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See also U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 3. The
United States Constitution grants Congress the express power to regulate commerce among the
states. This includes any items or materials that may make its way across state lines and may produce
an economic transaction.
154 This solution is strictly for federally registered trademarks. Trade dress, or any other
intellectual property that may be analyzed under § 2(a) is not at issue.
155 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052. See also In re Tam,
the use of government resources not wh
149
150

156 See Tam, 808 F.3d at 1364. See also The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 84 (1879). Trademarks are how manufacturers and merchants identify their manufactures and merchandise. They are
the symbols by which men engaged in trade and manufactures become known in the marketplace, by
which their reputation and that of their goods are extended and published; and as they become better
known, the profits of their business are enhanced.
157 See
, 391 U.S. at 377. The Court held that an important governmental
interest justified the conviction of the defendant for publicly burning his selective service registration
certificate in violation of a law which prohibited the knowing destruction of Selective Service
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government to ensure that the marks that are disseminated are not ones that may
extremely offend, produce a negative result, or be distasteful to a majority of
America.158 This is significantly important because of the racial intolerances plaguing
the country currently.159
disparaging remarks in the name of commercial speech. 160 Since protection granted
to commercial speech is minimal, the government would meet its burden under the
intermediate scrutiny analysis because the government has a substantial interest in
the orderly flow of commerce.161
y to regulate commerce, and that entails
controlling the dissemination of marks that will negatively affect specific groups. 162 A
the mark offends or is distasteful on its face, it should not be allowed to disseminate. 163
This solution allows the government to protect potential affected groups from
widespread disparaging marks.
B. The Disparagement Test 2.0
Many are at odds with section 2 of the Lanham Act because of its apparent
intrusion into the free speech realm.164 The Federal Circuit held that the

registration certificates. The government had a substantial interest in assuring the continuing
availability of issued Selective Service certificates.
158 See Tam, 808 F.3d at 1364. The government need not support the inevitable consequence of
in-part and dissenting in-part.
159 Catherine E. Shoichet,
CNN
(November 5, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/24/us/racism-problem-cnn-kff-poll/. Compiled data
demonstrates a significant shift from several years ago when 25-30% of Americans described racism
Americans describing racism as a problem and a majority of them suggesting that racial tensions are
See Tam, 808 F.3d at 1364.
See Lebanese, 94 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1218; see Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 258; see
Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 302. The government would meet its burden because it has a substantial
interest in the orderly flow of commerce. Such hostile marks may have a disruptive effect on the
market, causing tensions to rise. Furthermore, not allowing this marks to enter the stream of
commerce is the only way to combat the potential secondary harmful effects.
162 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See Tam, 808 F.3d at 1381. The impact of advancing these
bigoted messages through the ubiquitous channels of commerce may be discriminatory, and even if
not discriminatory, at least disruptive to commerce. Reyna, J., dissenting. This is important because
the government should not/does not want to encourage or promote such messages. This could affect
the state of commerce, being that individuals may not want to travel to certain places because of
certain Marks, and this could become an epidemic affecting trade.
163 The Supreme Court has recognized that a burden on commercial speech may be incidental.
The burden is permissible if it is
interest. See
, 391 U.S. at 377.
164 See Emily M. Kustina, Discriminatory Discretion: PTO Procedures and Viewpoint
Discrimination Under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, 164 U. Pa. L. Rev. 513, 537. Kustina asserts
that excessive discretion stemming from unclear guidelines can lead to First Amendment violations
160
161

discrimination that violates the First Amendment in two ways: first, by targeting speech on the basis
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disparagement provision is content-based and viewpoint discriminatory on its face
because the USPTO may reject marks under § 2(a) when it finds that marks refer to a
group in a negative way, but it permits the registration of marks that refer to a group
in a positive, non-disparaging way.165 Also, the Court found issue with the possibility
of arbitrary enforcement.166 These concerns could be addressed by restructuring it to
consider individuals outside of the affected group also. 167
Restructuring the disparagement test would potentially eliminate any concerns
regarding arbitrary or inconsistent enforcement. 168 The disparagement test, as it
of the mark169 and then determine
whether that meaning is likely to disparage a substantial composite of that referenced
group. 170 When developing a test of this nature, it is essential to understand and to
take into consideration an array of things.171 Registered marks that travel the channels
of commerce affect every person, and even though, a person may not be subjected to
the disrepute personally, it could affect the marketplace. 172
The test for disparagement should be strictly tailored to language or ideas that
would make the specified group AND people outside of that group uncomfortable,
isolated, or even suppressed or fearsome.173 Essentially, the test should revert back to
the test used for scandalous-ness.174 For example, an organization that seeks to
of the ideas it conveys, and second, by targeting speakers on the basis of their inherent characteristics.
Id. at 537-38.
165 Tam, 808 F.3d at 1336. The USPTO has registered marks that refer positively to people of
Asian descent (Celebrasians, Asian Efficiency). Although I argue that § 2(a) is not viewpoint
discrimination because the government is not advancing its own viewpoints, I offer a restructured test
to focus on the Federal Circuits concerns.
166 See id. at 1359. However, there are several checks in place to ensure that the test is not used
arbitrarily. See
reduce arbitrariness and simplify the procedures for granting trademarks at the federal level.
167 See In re Mavety Media Group, 33 F.3d at 1374. This test would be similar to the scandalous
test with more focus being placed on the facts and the history of what the mark represents.
168 Marc J. Randazza, Freedom of expression and Morality-Based Impediments to the
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 16 Nev. L.J. 107, 125. In the context of a denial of
registration, it almost seems impossible for the decision to be void of complete arbitrariness.
169 See Lebanese, 94 U.S.P.Q. at 1218. The likely meaning is determined by looking to
dictionaries, the relationship of the matter to other elements of the mark, the nature of the goods or
services, and the manner in which the mark is used in the marketplace in connection with the goods
or services.
170 See id. A mark is disparaging when it dishonors by comparison with what is inferior,
degrades, or affects or injures by unjust comparison.
171 It is important to take into consideration every race, religious group, gender, and/or
controversial class. Different individuals have different concerns and views regarding what is
disparaging and what is not. While one specific group may be the group being targeted, individuals
outside of the group endure the effect of the particular discrimination as well being that all
individuals are a part of the marketplace, all individuals should be included.
172 See Tam, 808 F.3d at 1375. One can hardly imagine what legitimate interest a vendor of goods
or services may have in insulting potential customers. Whatever value disparaging speech might
possess when used in private life, it loses when used in commerce. Reyna, J., dissenting.
173 The restructured test would encompass the views of the specified group as well as people
nto account. The general
public understands what is inappropriate and of ill-repute, regardless of race, nationality, religious
affiliation, and/or gender; and they should contribute to the second component of the test.
174 See Lebanese Arak Corp., 94 U.S.P.Q. at 1215. See also TMEP § 1203.01. The determination
of whether a mark is scandalous must be made in the context of the relevant marketplace for the
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would be denied registration.
When an examiner encounters a questionable mark or a mark that they are
unsure of, the test would be applied. First, the likely meaning of the mark is
considered. An examiner should research dictionary definitions, the history of the
elements within the mark, and the nature of the goods or services. In determining the
arch the history
of the mark or symbol.175 Second, an examiner must determine whether that mark is
likely to disparage the American public, and more importantly, affect the marketplace.
Under this part of the test, it is important to observe the facts regarding the elements
of the mark and the history of the elements of the mark. 176 Surveys and general
testimonies should be considered in determining whether this mark is one of ill-repute
and should not be allowed in the marketplace. 177
This reversion back to the scandalous-ness test allows many views into the
equation. Thus, the USPTO will not be warranted in denying registration to a specific
mark unless a majority of America decides that a mark is disparaging.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress enacted the Lanham (Trademark) Act to provide a national system for
registering and protecting trademarks used in interstate and foreign commerce. 178 The
Act sets forth guidelines that each applicant and examiner must follow to complete the
registration process successfully.179 Tam argued that section 2(a) of the Lanham Act
was unconstitutional because it impeded his right of free speech. 180
goods or services identified in the application, and must be ascertained from the standpoint of not
n
175 See Josh Burek, What are the Origins of Cross Burning? The Christian Science Monitor,
December 13, 2002, http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/1213/p25s04-wonq.html
crossburning was used by the Scottish as rallying symbols on their way to war.
176 See id. See Brenden Koerner, Why Does the Ku Klan Burn Crosses? Slate (December 17, 2002),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2002/12/why_does_the_ku_klux_klan_bur
n_crosses.html. The practice of cross-burning dates back to Medieval Europe, an era the Klan idealizes
as morally pure and racially homogenous. In the days before floodlights, Scottish clans set hillside
crosses ablaze as symbols of defiance against military. It was not until the film adaption of Thomas
a pivotal cross-burning scene connecting the Klan to
Scottish clans, that Klansmen started burning crosses to intimidate minorities, Catholics, and anyone
else suspected of betraying the order's ideals. The first reported burning took place in Georgia on
Thanksgiving Eve, 1915. Cross-burning has been associated with racist violence ever since. See also
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). The Court held that while a State may ban cross burning
carried out with the intent to intimidate, the provision in the Virginia statute treating ANY cross
burning as prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate renders the statute unconstitutional. Id. at
347-48.
177 See In re Squaw Valley Development Company, Serial Nos. 76511144 and 76511145, (TTAB
2006), (last accessed May 10, 2017), available at https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
com/sol/foia/ttab/2aissues/2006/76511144re.pdf. Survey evidence is used in the second part of the
disparagement test.
178 Tam, 808 F.3d at 1328.
179 See 15 U.S.C. § 1051. Section 2(a), in particular, creates a preliminary bar on marks that may
be disparaging to a specific group.
180 See Tam, 808 F.3d at 1332.
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Tam claimed that the USPTO erred in finding that his band name/mark was
disparaging because he chose his mark, THE SLANTS,
181 The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
2(a) violated
the First Amendment.182
ion that trademarks were private speech,
federally registered trademarks are better characterized as commercial speech.183 All
be considered private speech mainly because it has an expressive element to it.184
The most successful proposal is to view trademarks as commercial speech.
Registered trademarks are essentially advertisements that promote a product or
service. Being that registered trademarks travel among state lines, the government
should be able to regulate them.185 If trademarks are viewed as commercial speech,
intermediate scrutiny would be the standard to apply. Since the law is substantially
related to an important governmental interest in the orderly flow of commerce and
Furthermore, the disparagement test should be reverted back to include the general
public as they, too, may be affected (if not directly, indirectly) by disparaging marks.
This reversion will further the goal of objectivity and marks will not be denied
registration unless a substantial part of the American public views the mark as
disparaging.
Tam catapults America back decades with a decision that
will prove to have devastating backlash in the
race and inequality
issues. This decision binds the USPTO. However, this decision does not bind other
circuits.186 Until the Supreme Court hands down its decision, the fate of the
ability to protect its citizens from disparaging marks hangs in the balance.
There is no doubt that many extremely offensive trademarks will follow based on
this decision, and unless the Supreme Court rules that trademarks should be viewed
as commercial speech, there is nothing that can be done about it.

Id. at 1331.
See Id. at 1357-58.
183 See id. at 1339.
184 Tam, 808 F.3d at 1368-69. The risk is that every mark owner could argue this, and offensive,
disparaging marks would be registered constantly.
185 Id. at 1379-80. Judge Reyna explaining that commerce does not benefit from political
volatility, nor from insults, discrimination, or bigotry. Commerce is a communal institution regulated
for the mutual economic benefit of all. Reyna, J., dissenting.
186 See Michael Baroni, Warning: Offensive Trademarks Lie Ahead, 58 Orange County Lawyer
34, 38 (2016).
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